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Estimating Trends in US Income Inequality Using the Current 
Population Survey: The Importance of Controlling for Censoring 
 
Using internal and public use March Current Population Survey data, we analyze trends in 
US income inequality (1975–2004). Using a multiple imputation approach where values for 
censored observations are imputed using draws from a Generalized Beta distribution of the 
Second Kind, we find that the upward trend in income inequality significantly slowed after 
1993. Our results closely match the income share trends reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) 
except for within the top 1 percent of the distribution. Thus, we argue that if inequality has 
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 Introduction 
 
The public use version of the March Current Population Survey (CPS) is the primary data 
source used by public policy researchers and administrators to investigate trends in average 
income and its distribution in the United States as well as in cross-national comparisons of 
income inequality with other countries.  (For systematic reviews of the cross-national income 
inequality literature, see Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995, Gottschalk and 
Smeeding, 1997, Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001. For more recent examples of the use of the 
public use CPS in measuring income inequality trends in the United States see: Burkhauser, 
Couch, Houtenville and Rovba 2003-2004, Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005 and Kruger and 
Perri, 2006.) The consensus of this research, based on public use CPS data is that income 
inequality in the United States increased substantially in the 1970s and 1980s and also 
increased relative to other OECD countries.  
Despite the widely held view that income inequality has increased substantially since 
the 1980s, most of the evidence of a large increase in income inequality since 1993 has come 
from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) administrative record data based on personal adjusted 
gross income that the IRS has made available to the research community in tabular form 
(Piketty and Saez, 2003). In contrast, we argue that yearly income inequality increases are 
small, and significantly smaller than the increases over the nearly two decades of CPS data 
available to us prior to 1993.   
We compare our CPS-based estimates of inequality trends with those of Piketty and 
Saez (2003) based on IRS data. When, like Piketty and Saez, we focus on the share of 
reported income held by subgroups within the richest tenth of the distribution, our trends 
fairly closely match their trends, except for the top 1 percent of the distribution over the 
period 1975–2004. On the basis of these findings, we argue that if income inequality has been 
substantially increasing since 1993 in the USA, such increases have been confined to the very 
upper tail of the income distribution. 
Our analysis derives from unprecedented access to internal CPS data. To protect the 
confidentiality of its respondents, the Census Bureau censors each source of income of 
individuals above specified topcoded levels in the public use data made available to the 
research community. However, for its official work, researchers at the Census Bureau have 
access to the internal March CPS that is less severely censored. For instance, the yearly 
income and income inequality values reported in U.S. Census Bureau (various years) are 
based on the internal March CPS data. We use these data too. 
  1We analyze trends in the inequality of size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer household 
income in the USA between 1975 and 2004. Estimates of inequality levels and trends derived 
from CPS internal data are compared with estimates from several series derived from public 
use data. In particular, using the internal data, we derive a cell mean series in which topcoded 
incomes in the public use data, for each year back to 1975, are replaced by the mean of all 
income values above the topcode for any income source of any individual in the public use 
that has been topcoded.
1 This cell mean series can be used in conjunction with cell means 
provided by the Census Bureau for later years to create a complete set of cell means for 
topcoded observations. See Larrimore, Burkhauser, Feng, and Zayatz (forthcoming) for a 
detailed discussion of the creation of this cell mean series and all cell mean values. 
When we use the public use data augmented with imputations for topcoded 
observations from the extended cell mean series, we closely match yearly mean income and 
income inequality levels and trends in the United States population derived from internal 
data.
2 Internal data are themselves censored albeit to a substantially smaller extent than the 
public use data, and there are time-inconsistencies in censoring practices in the internal data. 
However, we show using consistent censoring methods that the trends in inequality derived 
from our public use extended cell mean series are not significantly affected by time-
inconsistent censoring levels. The exception is between 1992 and 1993, when the public use 
extended cell mean series overstates the rise in inequality because it does not take full 
account of the significant increases in internal censoring levels that took effect in 1993, and 
other CPS redesign aspects.    
Because consistently censored public use and internal data do not contain information 
about the very highest incomes, they understate the level of income inequality. However, 
once the break between 1992 and 1993 is controlled for, income inequality based on all these 
                                                 
1 Each CPS survey measures income from the previous calendar year. In this paper, all references are to the 
income year, so when we discuss the year 1975, this refers to income from various sources that members of the 
household received in 1975 reported at the March 1976 Current Population Survey interview.  
2 In 2006, we were granted permission to use the internal March CPS to test the sensitivity of measured income 
inequality in the public use CPS. We were given access to internal March CPS records from 1975–2004. These 
data include information on income above the public use topcode thresholds for respondents in the March CPS 
survey up to the processing limit in the March CPS data. The internal March CPS data the Census Bureau uses 
to produce the statistics in its official Census publications are subject to these same processing limits. However 
these processing limits are lower than the data collection limits for income in the March CPS, which are the 
limits on the actual values collected in the March CPS. (See Welniak, 2003 for a more complete discussion of 
the processing limits and data collection limits.) Although we had access to the same income information the 
Census Bureau uses to produce its official Census publications, since our research project was limited to how 
topcoding in the public files and censoring in the internal files affect measurement of inequality in the USA, the 
files do not contain the responses to all of the non-income related questions in the March CPS dataset. These 
omissions occur because the U.S. Census Bureau limits internal data availability to data within the scope of the 
project. 
  2data series yield the same trends, namely a rise in inequality between 1975 and 1992 followed 
by a significantly smaller increase in inequality after 1993. Our key findings are generally 
robust to whether income inequality is summarized using the Gini coefficient or three other 
widely-used indices.  
Because of the censoring in the internal CPS data, even our extended cell mean series 
does not incorporate information about the very highest incomes. To address this issue, we 
use a multiple imputation approach in which, for each year, values for censored observations 
in the internal data are imputed using draws from a Generalized Beta distribution of the 
Second Kind (GB2) fitted to internal data. Using the augmented internal data, we investigate 
the extent to which the systematic exclusion of the top part of the distribution affects 
estimates of the level and trends in inequality. Unsurprisingly, we find that compared to 
estimates derived from the multiple imputation approach, the unadjusted internal data as well 
as the consistently censored public use and internal data all understate the level of inequality 
in all years. However, all the series reveal the same trends: an increase in inequality over the 
entire period 1975–2004, but with a rate of increase noticeably lower after 1993 compared to 
before 1993.  
Finally, we compare our CPS-based estimates of trends in top income shares based on 
distributions of size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer household income distributions to the 
estimates of top income shares derived by Piketty and Saez (2003) from IRS administrative 
data on adjusted personal gross tax unit income. Both our and their estimates of the income 
share of the 90
th–95
th percentile group have a relatively flat trend during the period 1975–
2004, although the Piketty and Saez (2003) values are slightly higher in level. Similarly, for 
the shares of the 95
th–99
th percentile group, despite slight differences in levels, the two series 
exhibit remarkably similar trends over the 30 year period. In contrast, while the share of 
income held by the richest 1 percent increased substantially over this period according to both 
our CPS-based and the IRS-based Piketty and Saez (2003) estimates, their estimates of the 
size of the income shares and of the magnitude of the increase over time are much larger than 
ours.  
In the next section, we explain the nature of censoring in the CPS public use and 
internal data, and explain the several methods by which we address this issue. In particular, 
we explain how we derive a public use data series augmented by cell mean imputations for 
topcoded observations based on the censored internal data.  We also explain how we derive 
other data series in which public use and internal data are augmented by imputations for 
censored observations using draws from a parametric income distribution model fitted to the 
  3data. And we explain our method of ‘consistent’ censoring. At the heart of the paper are 
comparisons of estimates derived from the various CPS data series of income inequality 
levels and trends for the period 1975–2004. The fourth section provides a comparison of 
CPS-based estimate of trends in top income shares with the trends reported by Piketty and 
Saez (2003) using IRS administrative record data. The final section of the paper presents a 
summary and conclusions. 
  Throughout the paper, income is defined as pre-tax post-transfer household income 
excluding capital gains, adjusted for differences in household size using the square root of 
household size.
3 Each individual is attributed with the size-adjusted income of the household 
to which he or she belongs. Income refers to income for the calendar year preceding the 
March interview. We convert the small number of negative and zero household income 
values each year to one dollar prior to our calculations because a number of inequality indices 
are defined only for positive income values. Our samples for each year are all individuals in 
CPS respondent households, excluding individuals in group quarters or in households 
containing a member of the military. All statistics are calculated using the relevant CPS 
sampling weights. 
 
Censoring in the March CPS  
 
Topcoding in CPS public use data 
In the March CPS, a respondent in each household is asked a series of questions on the 
sources of income for the household. Starting in 1975, respondents reported income from 11 
sources and since 1987 they have done so for income from 24 sources. See Appendix Table 1 
for a list of these income sources. Rather than simply topcoding high total household income 
values in the public use data, the US Census Bureau topcodes high values for each source of 
household income. See Larrimore, Burkhauser, Feng, and Zayatz (forthcoming) for a full list 
of topcode values over time in the public use data. Prior to 1995, the Census Bureau assigned 
the topcode value from that source of income to all topcoded income values in the public use 
data. Since then, they have substituted a cell mean value derived from the internal data to 
each topcoded value in the public use data. 
                                                 
3 We follow the same procedure for generating size-adjusted household income as discussed in Burkhauser and 
Larrimore, 2008.  These procedures, particularly the use of the square root of household members to adjust for 
household size are standard in the international comparative income distribution literature: see for instance 
Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995). Its use is increasing in studies of US income distribution trends. See 
Burkhauser, Couch, Houtenville and Rovba (2004), Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), and Burkhauser, Osaki, 
and Rovba (2008). 
  4Because the Census Bureau cell means series starts in 1995, using the public use data 
without correcting for this major change in the values included for the highest incomes, 
source by source, results in a significant increase in measured income and income inequality 
in 1995 and subsequently simply because of the closer correspondence between the true 
reported income and the value included in the public use file. Hence, whereas the use of cell 
mean imputations after 1995 makes the public use data better conform to the internal data, 
not taking this improvement in measurement into account overestimates how much actual 
income increased in 1995 among those at the highest income levels and the overall levels of 
income inequality. An additional complication is that household income is the aggregation of 
multiple income sources (income types and household members), each of which may be 
topcoded. As a result, the prevalence of topcoding in household income is significantly 
greater than for any particular income source, and topcoded household income values are not 
necessarily the highest incomes – they may occur throughout the income distribution. Thus 
using the ratio of the 90
th percentile to the 10
th percentile (the ‘P90/P10 ratio’) to minimize 
the impact of topcoding on inequality estimates will not be entirely successful: see 
Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins (2007).  
The major change in the public use data in 1995 is a specific example of the more 
general problem that income topcoding presents researchers interested in measuring levels 
and trends in the income and income distribution of the US population. Inconsistently-
defined topcode values lead to artificial increases or decreases in mean income and income 
inequality, since different fractions of the population are subject to topcoding each year.
4 This 
is a legitimate concern since topcodes in the public use data have, in general, increased in a 
non-systematic manner over its history, and part of the apparent trend in average income and 
income dispersion over time in the uncorrected data is caused by topcoding capturing a larger 
portion of the income distribution. Using cell mean imputations for topcoded observations 
substantially alleviates this problem after 1995, since cell means provide the information 
necessary to capture the income distribution represented by the internal data. As a result, even 
if public topcodes are inconsistently adjusted in the public use data, mean income for the 
entire population in the internal data can be matched with the public use data using cell mean 
imputations. 
Despite the Census Bureau’s attempt to alleviate the problem of topcoding, their cell 
means have generally been ignored by researchers studying long-term income trends in the 
                                                 
4 See Levy and Murnane (1992) for an early review of the income distribution literature and a more formal 
statement of this problem. 
  5USA, since to do otherwise exacerbates time-inconsistencies that arise from using unadjusted 
public use data for the pre-1995 period and CPS data with cell mean imputations thereafter. 
Instead, researchers analyzing CPS data that includes years prior to 1995 use other methods 
of controlling for inconsistent topcoding in the public use data. These methods include 
measuring inequality with P90/P10 ratios (e.g. Danziger and Gottschalk, 1993; Gottschalk 
and Danziger, 2005; Daly and Valletta, 2006); artificially truncating the data by removing the 
highest and lowest two percent of observations (e.g. Welch, 1999); or artificially lowering the 
topcodes to create a series in which for each income source, a constant percentage of that 
source’s income distribution is censored in the data for each year (e.g. Karoly and Burtless, 
1995; Burkhauser, Butler, Feng, and Houtenville, 2004). This is referred to as the consistent 
censoring method. While each of these methods is preferable to using unadjusted data, each 
has drawbacks.  
Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins (2007) show that using P90/P10 ratios does not 
completely alleviate topcoding problems, since incomes are topcoded by income source (not 
by total income) and so there are topcoded incomes below the 90
th percentile. Additionally, 
the P90/P10 ratio captures different aspects of the income distribution than widely-used 
measures of dispersion such as the Gini coefficient or members of the Generalized Entropy 
family.  
Consistent censoring of the public use data can also cause problems. The percentage 
of individuals with topcoded incomes, whether based on their own income or the income of 
others in their household each year in the public use data, has grown sporadically over time 
from just under 1 percent in 1975 to nearly 6 percent in 2006: see Figure 1. Unless public use 
data topcodes are systematically increased over time as income increases, these topcodes cut 
deeper into the income distribution. In that case, consistent censoring methods do an 
increasingly poorer job of capturing trends at the top of the income distribution as they 
remove larger fractions of the population to maintain their consistency.  
 
  6Figure 1 
Percentage of Individuals with Censored Household Income in March CPS, by year 
 
Internal data were not available for years after 2004. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of March CPS. 
 
 
Censoring in CPS internal data 
Using public use data with cell mean imputations cannot solve the problem of censoring 
entirely, because the internal data from which the cell means are derived are themselves 
censored, albeit to a lesser degree than the public use data: see Figure 1.  
Censoring in the internal data was initially implemented due to data-storage 
limitations  in the computing systems of the 1970s which necessitated truncating written 
records to 5 digits. This was most binding on wage income, self-employment income and 
farm income. While these data storage limitations are no longer a constraint, the Census 
Bureau continues its internal censoring practice, partly due to concerns about data reliability 
of individuals who report an extremely high income value and partly due to concerns about 
confidentiality.  
  7In 1985 censoring limits were raised to $250,000 on each source of labor earnings and 
internal censoring fell close to zero. Subsequent increases in censoring values have kept the 
percentage of censored individuals in the internal data well below 1 percent although 
increases in censoring from non-labor income sources in the past few years has increased the 
share of censored individuals somewhat since 1994.  See Larrimore, Burkhauser, Feng, and 
Zayatz (forthcoming) for the censoring levels over time for each income source in the internal 
data and see Ryscavage (1995), Jones and Weinberg (2000), Welniak (2003), and Burkhauser 
et al. (2004), for earlier discussions of the problems of censoring in the public use and 
internal data. 
Because we had access to the internal CPS data, we are able for the first time to 
correct for censoring in these data back to 1975, and hence provide a more consistent 
measure of trends in the income distribution and compare these trends with those found with 
the public use data. 
 
A Consistent Censoring Approach 
Consistent censoring (e.g. Karoly and Burtless, 1995; Burkhauser, Butler, Feng, and 
Houtenville, 2004) creates censoring points for each income source that captures the same 
percentile of that source’s income in every year. Because total household income is derived 
as the sum of all of the individual sources of income in a household, it is necessary to create a 
consistent censoring point for each of these sources of income over all years. We do so by 
finding the year at which the censoring point for a given source is at the lowest point in the 
distribution of income within that source and then using that percentile as our cutoff point for 
that source for all years. Since the sources of income reported by the Census Bureau changed 
in 1987, we recode income and censoring points for years after this time to the pre-1987 
sources in order to create a time consistent series across the entire 30 year period between 
1975 and 2004. Appendix Table 2 reports the percentage of the distribution affected by our 
censoring points and the year in which the most restrictive censoring points occurred for each 
source of income in both the public use and internal data sets.  
The consistent censoring approach makes no parametric assumptions about the 
underlying income distribution, and maximizes the use of the common proportion of the 
available income information. Nevertheless, by construction, the approach ignores the very 
highest incomes in the distribution each year, and so it will underestimate levels of inequality. 
However, the fractions omitted do not vary over time, and so this approach provides time-
  8consistent trends of inequality for the part of the distribution below a certain fixed percentile 
that it does capture.  
 
A Multiple Imputation Approach 
To correct for censoring and also capture the whole distribution, we develop the imputation 
idea in a different direction. The key differences from the cell mean approach are, first, we 
attempt to account for censoring in the internal data (as well as in public use data) and, 
second, we derive imputations for censored values using a parametric model of the income 
distribution (since, by definition, the ‘true’ uncensored underlying income in the internal data 
are not available to us). Third, while the cell mean approach leads to a single imputation for 
each topcoded value, we derive multiple imputed values using a suitable randomization 
procedure which leads to multiple distributions for each year, and account for potential 




he parametric model of the income distribution used for the imputation model is the 
Generalized Beta of the Second Kind (GB2). The GB2 is a flexible form widely used in the 
income distribution literature, and a number of studies have shown that it fits income 
distributions extremely well across different times and countries: see e.g. Bordley, McDonald 
and Mantrala (1996), Brachmann, Stich and Trede (1996), and Bandourian, McDonald, and 
Turley (2002). Feng, Burkhauser, and Butler (2006) fitted GB2 distributions to labor earnings 
using public use CPS data and argue that their Gini coefficients calculated from the fitted 
GB2 distributions provide more plausible estimates of inequality trends than do the Gini 
coefficients derived from unadjusted internal data reported by the Census Bureau.  
ur multiple imputation approach differs from earlier studies that used parametric 
models to derive imputed values for topcoded incomes: see Fichtenbaum and Shahidi (1988) 
and Bishop, Chiou, and Formby (1994). First, those authors fitted a one-parameter Pareto 
distribution to the upper ranges of the income distribution, rather than the more flexible four-
parameter GB2 model. Second, our approach takes account of the fact that, rather than being 
common to all individuals, censoring levels vary across individuals (because censoring is 
done at the level of each income source rather than at the level of aggregate household 
income). Third, by using multiple imputation methods, rather than a single imputation, we 
account for the variability intrinsic in the imputation process.   
ur multiple imputation approach involves five steps. First, for each year’s data, we fit 
a GB2 distribution by maximum likelihood, accounting for individual level right-censoring. 
In fitting the GB2 distribution, we model individual household size-adjusted income at the 
  9aggregate level, not for each income source separately.  Doing so the other way would 
require modeling the joint distribution of 24 income sources (11 before 1987) for various 
members of each household and as a result our approach is more parsimonious and tractable.  
To ensure that model fit is maximized at the top of the distribution, the GB2 is fitted using 
observations in the richest 70 percent of the distribution only (using appropriate corrections 
for left truncation in the ML procedure). Second, for each observation with a censored 
income, we draw a value from the income distribution that is implied by the fitted GB2 
distribution, using an appropriate stochastic procedure. Third, using the distribution 
comprising imputations for censored observations and observed incomes for non-censored 
observations, we estimate our various inequality indices. Fourth, we repeated steps 2 and 3 
one hundred times, and finally, we combine the one hundred sets of estimates from each of 
the one hundred data sets for each year using the ‘averaging’ rules proposed by Rubin (1987) 
and modified by Reiter (2003)  for the case of partially synthetic data. See Jenkins, 
Burkhauser, Feng and Larrimore (2008) for further details of our multiple imputation 
approach. 
In what follows we estimate inequality levels and trends using different series defined 
according to the method by which we take account of censoring, and whether the basis source 
is the public use or internal data. The series, and the acronyms by which we refer to them 
subsequently, are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Income Distribution Series Derived from the March CPS,  
by Source and Method for Addressing Censoring 
Acronym Source  Method  for  Addressing Censoring Issues 
Internal-CC  Internal  Consistently Censoring  
Internal-Unadjusted Internal  Uses  internal  data as provided in Census Bureau files, 
without any adjustments 
Internal-MI Internal  Topcoded  observations replaced by imputations derived 
from GB2 imputation model fitted to internal data; 
inequality estimates derived using multiple imputation 
combination methods. 
Public-CC  Public Use  Consistently Censoring 
Public-Unadjusted Public  Use Uses  public  use  data as provided in Census Bureau files; 
includes Census Bureau cell mean imputations for 
topcoded observations from 1995 onwards 
Public-CM  Public Use  Uses public use data as provided in Census Bureau files; 
includes cell mean imputations for topcoded 
observations for all years  
Public-NoCM  Public Use  Uses public use data as provided in Census Bureau files, 
except that no cell mean imputations used for any year 
(topcoded values used ‘as is’). 
Public-MI Public  Use  Topcoded  observations replaced by imputations derived 
from GB2 imputation model fitted to public use data; 
inequality estimates derived using multiple imputation 
combination methods. 
See main text for further details of the methods used to address censoring issues. 
 
 
Estimates of inequality levels and trends, 1975–2006 
 
The revised cell mean series (Public-CM) 
Figure 2 reports our estimates of income inequality levels and trends derived from four series: 
Public-NoCM, Public-Unadjusted, Public-CM, and Internal-Unadjusted. Inequality is 
summarized using the Gini coefficient. Because public use data are topcoded, mean 
household income and Gini coefficients derived from them will be understated relative to 
those estimated from the internal data unless cell mean imputations are used, since cell means 
provide more information about individuals at the top of the income distribution.  
  11Figure 2 
Gini Coefficient Estimates for Four Censoring Adjustment Methods, 1975–2006 
 
Internal data were not available for years after 2004. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of March CPS. 
 
 
In all years, the Gini estimates based on the Public-NoCM series are below those from 
the Internal-Unadjusted series. To correct for this difference (and for several other reasons), 
the Census Bureau revised its topcoding procedures in income year 1995. The result is 
reflected in the difference between the Gini estimates derived from the Public-NoCM and 
Public-Unadjusted series. Prior to 1995 the series are identical. After 1995 the Public-
Unadjusted Gini values equal the Internal-Unadjusted Gini values, and are dramatically 
greater than those derived from the Public-NoCM series. (Note that this is not the case in 
1999. We believe this is the result of an uncorrected error in the Census Bureau cell mean 
series.) While the Gini values from the Public-Unadjusted series now better represents the 
Gini values derived from the Internal-Unadjusted data, anyone uncritically using Gini values 
from the Public-Unadjusted data to describe changes in income inequality in the United 
States would greatly exaggerate its increase in 1995. 
  12  Our Public-CM series corrects this problem – the Gini estimates derived from these 
data match those derived from the Internal-Unadjusted data in all years including 1999: see 
Figure 2. Thus the addition of our cell mean imputations to the CPS public use data allows 
researchers without access to the Internal-Unadjusted data to produce the same inequality 
levels and trends found in the Internal-Unadjusted data. But anyone uncritically using Gini 
values based on the Internal-Unadjusted data to describe changes in income inequality would 
greatly exaggerate its increase in 1993 when major changes occurred in the way the CPS was 
collected including significant changes in the censoring points in the internal CPS data. 
 
Long term trends in US income inequality  
We now extend our analysis of long term trends using additional data series. There are six in 
total: Public-Unadjusted; Public-CC; Public-MI, Internal-Unadjusted; Internal-CC, and 
Internal-MI. Figure 3 depicts the trends over the period 1975–2004 in the Gini coefficients 
derived from each of the series. We stop at 2004 because that is the last year of internal CPS 
data to which we had access. 
As discussed above, the use of cell means since 1995 in the Public-Unadjusted data 
allows researchers to estimate Gini coefficients that closely match those estimated using the 
Internal-Unadjusted data since then. But using the Public-Unadjusted Gini estimates to 
describe trends in income inequality before and after 1995 distorts these trends. When we 
consistently censor public use data (Public-CC series), the Gini estimate for each year is 
below the corresponding estimate from the Public-Unadjusted data: see Figure 3. But the 
artificial jump in 1995 in the Public-Unadjusted Gini values is gone and the trend in Public-
CC Gini values more closely follows the trends estimated using the Internal-Unadjusted data, 
including a noticeable rise in inequality between 1992 and 1993.  
  13Figure 3 
Gini Coefficient Estimates for Six Censoring Adjustment Methods, 1975–2004 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of March CPS. 
 
 
When we repeat this exercise by consistently censoring internal data (Internal-CC 
series), once again the Gini estimates are smaller than those based on the Internal-Unadjusted 
data but they are much closer to those estimated from the Internal-Unadjusted data than those 
based on the Public-CC data. This is unsurprising, since the Internal-CC data now reach a 
higher percentile of the Internal Unadjusted data. There remains a pronounced rise in 
inequality based on the Internal-CC data between 1992 and 1993, but that rise is much 
smaller that the rise shown by the Internal-Unadjusted series between those years. This 
suggests that part of the 1993 jump is due to changes in censoring levels in the Internal-
Unadjusted data in 1993. But even the smaller but pronounced increase in the Gini between 
1992 and 1993 that remains in the Internal-CC series is unlikely to come from a genuine 
change in income inequality and suggests that other changes in CPS data collection methods 
are responsible. (See Ryscavage, 1995 and Jones and Weinberg, 2000.) 
  14Because both the Public-MI and Internal-MI series capture the very highest incomes, 
it is not surprising that both lead to higher measured inequality levels than their respective 
unadjusted counterparts. Unlike the Public-Unadjusted series, the Public-MI series does not 
jump in 1995, suggesting that the jump in the Public-Unadjusted series at this point is purely 
due to introducing cell mean imputations into the public use data. On the other hand, the Gini 
estimates derived from the Internal MI series rose sharply in year 1993, showing the same 
pattern as Internal-Unadjusted series. This is additional evidence that the 1993 jump in Gini 
is primarily due to other survey design changes rather than data problems related to censoring.  
Gini estimates derived from the Public-MI and Internal-MI series are relatively close 
to each other, suggesting that our assumptions about the parametric form of the income 
distribution work consistently despite the differences in censoring prevalence in the public 
use and internal CPS data. Before 1993, the two series are nearly identical. They diverged 
somewhat between the 1993 to 2004 period, but are still relatively close overall. The average 
of the Public-MI Gini coefficients since 1993 is 0.431, only slightly lower than the 0.439 
average for the Internal-MI series.  
We now use regression analysis to more formally investigate whether the differences 
in levels and trends in inequality differ between the data series. Table 2 reports the results of 
our analysis of differences between the Gini estimates derived from Public-CC, Internal-CC, 
Public-MI, Internal-MI and those derived from Internal-Unadjusted CPS data. We do not 
consider the Public-Unadjusted series as it contains less information than the internal CPS 
data and its artificial 1995 jump makes it flawed compared to the other alternatives.   
The dependent variable (y) in the regressions is a Gini estimate for a given year and 
data series. The explanatory variables are: a constant, which is the Gini derived from the 
Internal-Unadjusted data; a time trend (t = 1, 2, …, 30), which summarizes the trend in this 
Gini; four dummy variables to represent other Gini data sources and thereby control for the 
difference between the Gini estimates from each series and the corresponding estimate from 
the Internal-Unadjusted series (pc = 1 if the series is Public-CC and 0 otherwise; ic = 1 if the 
series is Internal-CC and 0 otherwise; pm = 1 if the series is Public-MI and 0 otherwise; im = 
1 if the series is Internal-MI and 0 otherwise); interactions between each of the series dummy 
variables (pc, ic, pm, and im) and time (t), which controls for the difference between the 
trends across series; a dummy variable for post-1992 years (u) which controls for a change in 
the levels after 1992 using the internal data; interactions between each of the Gini source 
variables (pc, ic, pm, and im) separately interacted with u, which controls for divergence in 
levels after 1992; an interaction between t and u, which controls for changes in the trend after 
  151992 using internal data; and the Gini source variables (pc,  ic,  pm, and im) separately 
interacted with t and u, which controls for divergence between trends after 1992. 
First we discuss our results with respect to Gini estimates from the Internal-
Unadjusted series. The significant positive coefficient for time trend (t) shown in Table 2, 
column 1, shows that inequality rose between 1975 and 1992. After 1992, although inequality 
continued to rise, the rate of increase slowed significantly compared to the pre-1993 period 
(note the coefficients on t and especially t*u). There was also a significant jump in inequality 
in the post-1992 years compared to pre-1993 years: observe the statistically significant 
positive coefficient for u. However, much of this increase in inequality results from changes 
in survey methods and internal censoring points, as we demonstrate by comparisons with the 
other Gini series. 
The coefficients for pc and for interactions with it allow us to compare Gini estimates 
from the Public-CC series to the Internal-Unadjusted series. Because consistent censoring in 
the public use data imposes topcodes below those found in unadjusted public use data, it is 
unsurprising that the level of inequality is significantly lower using the Public-CC series than 
using the Internal-Unadjusted one. This can be seen for years prior to 1993 from the 
statistically significant negative coefficient for pc and, for years after 1992, from the 
statistically significant negative coefficient for interaction pc*u. Additionally, in 1993, when 
censoring points increased dramatically, we see that while inequality increased according to 
the Public-CC series (look at the coefficients on u + pc*u), the magnitude of the increase was 
substantially smaller than that in the Internal-Unadjusted series. This is also not surprising 
since consistent censoring dampens Gini levels in every year, and so is more likely to 
mitigate changes.   
Despite the statistically significant difference in levels of inequality and the artificial 
jump in inequality in 1992, in years other than 1992–1993 the trends in inequality shown by 
the Internal-Unadjusted series are not significantly different from those shown by the Public-
CC series: the coefficient on pc*t is not statistically significant. An F-test of the null 
hypothesis that pc*t + pc*t*u= 0 is not rejected, indicating that after 1992, the inequality 
trends in the two series are not significantly different.  
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Table 2 
Differences in Inequality Levels and Trends Based on Regression Analyses 
   Gini  I(0) I (1) I (2) 
constant 0.3528**  0.2850**  0.2121**  0.2489** 
  (0.0018) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0082) 
t (time trend)  0.0030** 0.0044** 0.0042** 0.0066** 
  (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
u (=1 if post-1992)  0.0592** 0.0190 0.1117**  0.3849** 
  (0.0047) (0.0261) (0.0099) (0.0454) 
t*u  –0.0023** 0.0002 –0.0032**  –0.0071** 
  (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0005)  (0.0021) 
pc (=1 if public CC)  –0.0158**  –0.0173*  –0.0250**  –0.0535** 
  (0.0025) (0.0073) (0.0035) (0.0085) 
pc*t  –0.0003  –0.0005  –0.0009*  –0.0026** 
  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0008) 
pc*u  –0.0282**  –0.0410  –0.0801**  –0.3586** 
  (0.0067) (0.0365) (0.0119)  (0.0464) 
pc*t*u  0.0006 0.0009  0.0015*  0.0059** 
  (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0022) 
ic (=1 if internal CC)  –0.0041  –0.0048  –0.0080*  –0.0204* 
  (0.0026) (0.0074) (0.0037)  (0.0088) 
ic*t  –0.0002  –0.0003  –0.0005  –0.0017* 
  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
ic*u  –0.0176*  –0.0274  –0.0632**  –0.3338** 
  (0.0067) (0.0376) (0.0126) (0.0497) 
ic*t*u  0.0004 0.0006  0.0012*  0.0061** 
  (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0023) 
pm (=1 if public MI)  0.0046* 0.0059  0.0115**  0.0382** 
  (0.0023) (0.0069) (0.0038) (0.0143) 
pm*t  0.0001 0.0002 0.0006  0.0043** 
  (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0015) 
pm*u  –0.0188*  –0.0265  –0.0498*  –0.2143 
  (0.0087) (0.0361) (0.0238)  (0.1565) 
pm*t*u  0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0055 
  (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0065) 
im (=1 if internal MI)  0.0043 0.0057  0.0122**  0.0508** 
  (0.0026) (0.0072) (0.0040) (0.0135) 
im*t  0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0029 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0018) 
im*u  –0.0026  –0.0032 0.0002 0.1110 
  (0.0073) (0.0359) (0.0256)  (0.2586) 
im*t*u  0.0003 0.0005 0.0010 0.0114 
   (0.0004)  (0.0015)  (0.0012)  (0.0115) 
The baseline data source is Internal-Unadjusted. Numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. ** Significant at 
the 1% level. * Significant at the 5% level. Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of 
March CPS. 
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can be replicated using the Public-CM series. So the comparison just undertaken could be 
repeated with a comparison between inequality levels derived from the Public-CC and 
Public-CM series. But the Public-CC series is clearly dominated by the Internal-CC series 
because internal data allow us to observe the reported incomes of a greater share of the 
population, while still controlling for problems of time inconsistency in censoring.  
Therefore, to check whether inequality trends of inequality according to Internal-
Unadjusted data differ significantly from those found for lower parts of the income 
distribution that are consistently censored, we also examined the differences between the 
inequality series based on the Internal-CC and Internal-Unadjusted series. While the Internal-
CC data imposes censoring points for observations at values below the incomes for the same 
observation in the Internal-Unadjusted data, the difference in levels of inequality is no longer 
significant for years prior to 1993: observe the negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient for ic. But the difference for the years after 1993 is significantly lower as can be 
seen by the statistically significant negative coefficient for ic + ic*u. However, once again, 
the difference in inequality trends between the Internal-CC and Internal-Unadjusted series are 
not significantly different either before 1993 (observe the coefficient on ic*t) or after 1992 
(ic*t + ic*t*u). 
We now examine the levels and time trends shown by the two Gini series using our 
multiple imputation method. Because the multiple imputation method imputes income values 
for censored observations, both Public-MI and Internal-MI lead to Gini estimates that are 
larger than their Internal-Unadjusted counterparts, although the differences are only 
significant at the 5 percent level for the Public-MI series (note the coefficients for pm and im). 
The Public-MI series also jumps in 1993 (u + pm*u), but the increase is much less than the 
jump shown by the Internal-Unadjusted series (shown by a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for pm*u). In contrast, as shown by a small negative and insignificant coefficient 
for im*u, the Internal-MI series jumps in 1993 almost as much as the Internal-Unadjusted 
series. This again shows that changes in survey methods are important factors underlying the 
measured change in inequality levels after 1993. Our results are consistent with Census 
Bureau warnings that pre-1993 and post-1992 inequality measures based on data from CPS 
internal data are not directly comparable (Jones and Weinberg 2000).  
Nevertheless, both Internal-MI and Public-MI series show the same linear time trend 
as the Internal-Unadjusted series, in both the pre-1993 and post-1992 periods. This is shown 
by the non-significance of the four time trend coefficients (pm*t, pm*t*u, im*t, and im*t*u). 
  18Thus, subject to the break in 1993, all five Gini series demonstrate the same time trends for 
the whole period 1975–2004. Also, the post-1992 rate of increase is much lower than the pre-
1993 period.  
 
Do results differ if different measures of inequality are used? 
The Gini coefficient is just one of many commonly-used indices of inequality. It incorporates 
particular assumptions about how income differences are aggregated at different parts of the 
income distribution: it is relatively sensitive to income differences in the middle of the 
distribution (‘middle sensitive’). This raises the question of whether alternative inequality 
measures, ones incorporating different aggregation assumptions, might lead to different 
conclusions about inequality trends, depending, for example, on whether changes in 
dispersion occur mainly at the top or the bottom of the distribution. We explore the sensitivity 
of our results to the choice of inequality measure by repeating our analysis using three indices 
from the Generalized Entropy parametric family. (See e.g. Cowell, 2000, or Jenkins and Van 
Kerm, 2009.) We employ the three most commonly used General Entropy (GE) measures: 
I(0), the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), which is a relatively bottom-sensitive index; I(1), 
the Theil index, which is relatively middle-sensitive; and I(2), half the squared coefficient of 
variation, which is an index that is top-sensitive.  
We calculated each of these GE indices using each of the six data series for which we 
derived Gini coefficients, and graph the estimates in Figures 4, 5 and 6 for I(0), I(1) and I(2) 
respectively. In all cases, measured inequality in a given year is greater in an internal data 
series than in its public use data counterpart.  
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I(0) Inequality Index Estimates for Six Censoring Adjustment Methods, 1975–2004 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of March CPS. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of March CPS. 
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I(2) Inequality Index Estimates for Six Censoring Adjustment Methods, 1975–2004 
 




Once again, the total period can be divided into three sub-periods, 1975–1992, 1992–
1993, and 1993–2004. For each sub-period, we calculated the average annual percentage 
change in each GE index and the Gini according to the different series: see Table 3. Once 
again, the estimates based on Public-Unadjusted data are not shown because of the cell mean 
problem. Table 3 shows that the change in measured income inequality between 1992 and 
1993 is much greater than the average change for each of the years before or after, regardless 
of the inequality index or data series used. This further suggests the changes between 1992 
and 1993 represent changes in survey practice rather than a genuine change in the distribution 
of income.  
Table 3 shows that average yearly increase in measured inequality is greater in the 
years prior to 1993 than in the years after 1993 for all measures across all data sets, but the 
difference is much less for the I(0) values than for any of the other measures. Because the I(0) 
  22values put more weight on income differences in the lower ranges of the income distribution, 
this suggests that changes in the upper ranges of the income distribution might be driving the 
slowdown of the increase in inequality in the period 1993–2004.  
 
Table 3 
Average Annual Percentage Change in inequality by period,  
using alternative March CPS datasets and inequality indices 
  Average annual percentage change 
   1975–1992 1992–1993 1993–2004 
Gini Coefficients       
     Unadjusted Internal  0.74    5.85  0.14 
     Consistent Censoring Public  0.75    1.93  0.23 
     Consistent Censoring Internal  0.74    3.24  0.21 
     MI-GB2 public  0.82    2.34  0.30 
     MI-GB2 Internal  0.77    6.63  0.20 
I(0)      
     Unadjusted Internal  1.48  12.48  1.20 
     Consistent Censoring Public  1.49    5.86  1.45 
     Consistent Censoring Internal  1.48    7.80  1.39 
     MI-GB2 public  1.63    6.41  1.47 
     MI-GB2 Internal  1.54  14.04  1.28 
I(1)      
     Unadjusted Internal  1.58  22.08  0.26 
     Consistent Censoring Public  1.63    3.67  0.55 
     Consistent Censoring Internal  1.61    7.71  0.59 
     MI-GB2 public  1.97    5.39  0.80 
     MI-GB2 Internal  1.72  29.32  0.43 
I(2)      
     Unadjusted Internal  1.76  71.82  0.03 
     Consistent Censoring Public  1.88    4.09  0.88 
     Consistent Censoring Internal  1.89  12.67  1.10 
     MI-GB2 public  3.31  11.22  1.69 
     MI-GB2 Internal  2.21  147.17  0.45 
Source: Authors’ calculations from internal and public use data files of March CPS. 
 
 
As we did for our Gini estimates, we now use regression analysis to examine more 
precisely the differences in the levels and trends in inequality according to the different data 
series, where inequality is now measured by the three GE indices: see columns 2 through 4 of 
Table 2. The explanatory variables in the regressions are defined in an analogous fashion to 
those employed when comparing Gini levels and trends.   
The results for I(0) clearly differ from those based on the Gini measure: see Table 2, 
column 2. While the basic finding of a rise in inequality is still present for the Internal-
  23Unadjusted series – the coefficient on t is positive and statistically significant – there is no 
change in the index’s trend after 1992, as the coefficient on t*u is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. All other series demonstrate the same time trend: the F-test 
that t + pc*t, t + ic*t, t + pm*t, and t + im*t each equal zero is soundly rejected at the 1 
percent level in each case. Similarly, none of the other series show a slowdown in the rising 
trend for the period 1993–2004. Even at the 10 percent level, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients on t*u+pc*t*u, t*u+ic*t*u, t*u+pm*t*u, and t*u+im*t*u 
equal zero.  
With the exception that the level of inequality described by the Public-CC series is 
significantly lower than the corresponding values from Internal-Unadjusted series – the 
coefficient on pc is negative and significant – all other variables in this regression are 
statistically insignificant. In addition, the trends found in all five series are not significantly 
different over the entire period. Since I(0) is relatively bottom-sensitive, and the differences 
between these different series arise at the top of the distribution, it is not surprising that the 
choice of censoring method makes little difference for this index.  
In contrast, the results for the I(1) values are very close to those found for the Gini 
coefficient: see Table 2, column 3. According to the Internal-Unadjusted series, the basic 
time trend (coefficient on t) is positive and statistically significant, as is the coefficient on u, 
while the coefficient on their interaction, t*u, is negative and statistically significant. Thus, as 
for the Gini index, inequality after 1992 according to I(1) is greater, but the annual increase in 
inequality since 1993 is significantly lower than in the years prior to 1993. 
When the Public-CC and Internal-CC series are used rather than the Internal-
Unadjusted one, the pre-1993 levels in I(1) are both significantly lower, as shown by the 
coefficients on pc and ic. For the post-1992 period, both series show significantly smaller 
jumps in levels: the coefficients on pc*u and ic*u are negative and statistically significant. 
But the post-1992 inequality levels are still significantly higher than those for the pre-1993 
period, for both series. The null hypotheses that u+pc*u and u+ic*u are each equal to zero are 
both soundly rejected. With respect to trends, the coefficient on pc*t is negative and 
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient on ic*t is negative but not statistically 
significant.  
The Public-MI and Internal-MI series both show higher levels of inequality than the 
Internal-Unadjusted series for corresponding years. The Public-MI series show a smaller 
jump in post-1993 levels, as shown by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
pm*u. Both series, though, show higher levels of inequality in the post-1993 period than in 
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of increase in the post-1993 period are significantly smaller, as shown by F-tests on 
t*u+pm*t*u and t*u+im*t*u. 
Finally, we turn to examine the levels and trends in I(2): see Table 2, column 4. 
According to the Internal-Unadjusted series, the basic time trend is positive and significant, 
as is the coefficient on t, while t*u is negative and significant. Therefore, as with the Gini and 
the I(1) indices, inequality after 1992 is greater but the annual increase in inequality since 
1993 is significantly lower than the increase over the years prior to 1993. 
When the Public-CC and Internal-CC series are compared to the Internal-Unadjusted 
one, the pre-1993 levels of I(2) are significantly lower for both series, as shown by the 
coefficients on pc and ic. For the post-1993 period, both series also show significantly 
smaller degrees of increase in levels because the coefficients of pc*u and ic*u are negative 
and statistically significant. But for both series, the post-1993 inequality levels are still 
significantly higher than the pre-1993 period. The null hypotheses that u+pc*u and u+ic*u 
each equal zero are both rejected. Both the CC series show smaller upward trend for the pre-
1993 period than does the Internal-Unadjusted one: the coefficients on pc*t and ic*t are 
negative and statistically significant. Although the Public-CC series shows a lower trend after 
1993 compared to before 1992, we cannot reject the null that the time trends before and after 
1993 are the same in the Internal-CC series.  
According to both the Public-MI and Internal-MI series, I(2) values are larger than the 
corresponding value in the Internal-Unadjusted series. In contrast to the time trend results for 
the Gini and I(1), the rates of increase in the post-1993 period are the same as the pre-1993 
period. Using F-tests, we find that the coefficients on t*u+pm*t*u and t*u+im*t*u are not 
significantly different from zero. These results, as well as the contrast with those for the Gini 
and I(1), may arise because I(2) estimates tend to have larger sampling variability relative to 
these other indices, other things being equal.
5 This can also be seen from large year-on-year 
changes in I(2) values, and the large differences between their Public-MI and Internal-MI 
estimates, especially in the post-1993 period (see Figure 6). Thus, more caution is warranted 
when interpreting I(2) values.  
 
                                                 
5 I(2) is also relatively prone to non-robustness to the effects of outliers in the sense discussed by Cowell and 
Victoria-Feser (1996). However, we would stress the sampling variability aspect, since the ‘averaging’ process 
used to combine the estimates from our 100 multiply imputed data sets are likely to smooth out the effects of 
any outliers being added by the imputation process. 
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Our results may surprise some readers – occasional users of the CPS may not be aware of the 
problems that inconsistent censoring can cause. For example, they may not be aware of 
comparability issues introduced by the Census Bureau’s use of cell mean imputations 
beginning in 1995, and the changes in the CPS (public use and internal data) before and after 
1993.
6 Other readers may be surprised by our findings because they appear to contradict the 
seminal work of Piketty and Saez (2003), who report substantial growth in income inequality 
as measured by the share of “adjusted gross income” (the amount of income that is taxable 
under federal income tax laws in place each year) held by tax units (unadjusted for household 
size) at the top of the distribution. 
Up to now, we have focused on how best to use CPS data to make statements about 
levels and trends in income inequality as it has conventionally been measured in the income 
distribution literature. (See Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997, and Atkinson and Brandolini, 
2001, for reviews.) In this section, we compare our CPS-based estimates of levels and trends 
in the income distribution with those of Piketty and Saez (2003).
7 In doing so, it is critical to 
point out that there are fundamental differences between the measurement conventions used 
when analyzing size-adjusted pre-tax post-transfer household income of individuals using 
cross-sectional surveys like the CPS and using IRS data on the adjusted gross income of tax 
units as done by Piketty and Saez (2003). Piketty and Saez (2003) were primarily interested 
in measuring very long run trends (since 1913) in US income inequality and, because of data 
limitations, focus only on a small part of that distribution – the share of adjusted gross 
income held by the top 10 percent of tax filing units and how that share is distributed within 
this part of the distribution.  
In Figure 7 we report our estimates of the share of total income (as discussed in the 
first part of this paper) held by the richest 10 percent of the population. We do so by 
cumulatively reporting the share held by the 90
th-95
th percentile group and then by this group 
                                                 
6 For instance, the most important source of standardized cross-sectional micro data on industrialized 
countries—the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)—uses the public use version of the CPS for its data on the 
USA. On its website (http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures/ineqtable.htm), LIS summarizes income inequality 
using P90/P10 and Gini coefficient estimates that do not adjust for the topcoding issues discussed here.  Nor 
does LIS currently provide its users with information on the degree that topcoding issues of this type are found 
in its data from other countries.  The public use CPS data as developed by LIS is also a major source of 
information about USA inequality in the United Nation University—World Income Inequality Database (UNU-
WIDER, 2008).  UNU-WIDER also does not alert its users of topcoding issues on its website 
(http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en GB/database). 
7 Piketty and Saez (2003) only constructed top income shares up to year 1998, but they subsequently updated 
this series to year 2006, see http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/.  It is these latter values that we report here. 
  26plus the next richest 4 percent (95
th-99
th percentile group) and finally by adding on the share 
held by the top 1 percentile group for each year 1975–2004, based on the Internal-MI series. 
We also report the corresponding cumulative share estimates from Piketty and Saez (2003) 
for their tax unit samples and use of adjusted gross income (excluding capital gains).  
 
Figure 7 
Estimates of Top Income Shares: Piketty & Saez and Internal-MI Series, 1975–2004 
 
Source: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/ and authors’ calculations from internal data files of 
March CPS. 
 
Our Internal-MI top share estimates are in general somewhat lower than the 
corresponding ones reported by Piketty and Saez (2003). This is not surprising since two 
quite different concepts of income are being used. For instance, adjusted gross income does 
not include government transfers since this income is not taxed. Because a much greater 
share of non-taxable government in-cash transfers – AFDC/TANF, Social Security benefits, 
etc. – are held by those in the poorest 90 percent of the pre-tax post transfer distribution, and 
this income is included in our income measure, we would expect those in the top 10 percent 
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adjusted gross income in all years, as is the case in Figure 7.  
Nevertheless, for both the income share held by the 90
th–95
th percentile groups and 
the 95
th–99
th percentile groups, the CPS-based and tax data-based series resemble each other 
closely, in terms of both levels and trends. This is remarkable given the very different 
underlying concepts of income and approaches taken. Both the Piketty and Saez (2003) IRS 
series and our Internal-MI CPS series suggest that the share of income held  by the 90
th–95
th 
percentile groups remained relatively stable during the whole period 1975–2004, accounting 
for around 10–12 percent of total income. In terms of the share of income held by the 95
th–
99
th percentile groups, the Piketty and Saez (2003) IRS-based estimate grows slowly from 13 
percent in 1975 to 15.1 percent in 2004. Over the same period, the growth in our 
corresponding Internal-MI CPS estimate is remarkably similar: an increase from 10.5 percent 
to 12.5 percent.  
In Figure 8, we disaggregate the share of income held by the richest 10 percent of the 
income distribution further by reporting the share of income held by percentile groups within 
the 95
th–99
th percentile group according to our Internal-MI CPS series. Although income 
shares increased slightly at the higher percentiles, through to the 99
th percentile group, these 
increases were relatively modest. Even for the 98
th–99
th percentile group, the growth in 
income shares from 1975–2004 was less than 1 percentage point.   
  28Figure 8 
Estimates of Top Income Shares: Internal-MI Series, 1975–2004 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using internal March CPS data 
 
In contrast to the similar trends found in the share of income held by those in the 90
th–
99
th percentile group using either the Piketty and Saez (2003) series or our Internal-MI series, 
there are substantial differences between the two series with respect to the level and trends in 
the share of income held by the richest 1 percent. While the share of income help by the 
richest 1 percent grew substantially over the 1975–2004 period according to both series, 
growth in the Piketty and Saez (2003) series is much greater, from 8.0 percent to 16.1 percent 
compared to an increase from 5.4 percent to 9.8 percent in the Internal-MI CPS series. But 
this difference is even greater when it is observed that one third of the increase in the income 
share of the top 1 percent in the Internal-MI series from 1975–2004 occurred in 1993, and 
which is primarily attributable to the CPS redesign. Hence a significant minority of this 
increase in the share of income held by the top 1 percent in the Internal-MI series is likely to 
be due to better measurement of their income by the CPS rather than by an actual increase in 
the share of income they held.  
This same problem of changes in measurement versus changes in real income held by 
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income shares at the top of the income distribution in the Piketty and Saez (2003) series. As 
can be seen in Figure 7, there is a dramatic 4 percentage point jump in the share of gross 
taxable income held by the highest 1 percent of tax units reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) 
between the years 1986 and 1988. This finding must, to some degree, be the result of changes 
in the way the very richest tax units chose to report their income as a result of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 rather than the result of genuine changes in income inequality. This 
legislation provided substantial incentives for the very richest tax units to switch income from 
Subchapter-S corporations to wage income. (See Slemrod, 1996, and Reynolds, 2006 for a 
fuller discussion of this type of tax elasticity issue in the Piketty and Saez, 2003 data and 
Feenberg and Poterba, 1993 for a more general discussion of the problems of measuring 
income inequality based on income tax records.) Subtracting the 1986–1988 jump in the 
Piketty and Saez series would cut in half the increase in the share of income held by the 
richest 1 percent over the whole period. Their data for other years may also be subject to this 
same type of tax elasticity behavior, albeit to a lesser extent. For example, for a group of high 
income corporate executives, Goolsbee (2000) showed that almost all of the estimated 
responsiveness of taxable wage and salary income to marginal tax rates from 1991 to 1995 
was the result of shifts in the timing of compensation rather than permanent shifts in the form 
of compensation.   
Keeping this in mind, it is difficult to determine what is going on at the very top of the 
income distribution using either the CPS data or the IRS data. Piketty and Saez (2003) find 
greater increases in inequality after 1993 than we do primarily because of greater growth in 
the share of income held by the richest 1 percent in their IRS data. It is uncertain to what 
degree this difference is the result of our decreasing ability to capture income at the very 
highest income levels, even using internal CPS data, or of behavioral changes in the way that 
individual tax units report their adjusted gross income on their tax returns.  
The growth in income in the years just prior to the 2000 stock market crash was 
greater among the highest income groups, and the estimates of the income share of the richest 
1 percent from both series capture this increase as well as the decline in their share in the 
recession that followed the stock market crash. The CPS may have been less able to capture 
this income going to the top of the income distribution. But it also may be the case, as 
Reynolds (2006) argues, that a greater increase in the use of tax-deferred savings accounts 
(401k plans, Keogh plans and IRA tax shelters) by those in richer percentile groups but not in 
  30the very richest 1 percent of the adjusted gross income distribution of tax units may also 
explain part of the rise in the top income share reported by Piketty and Saez (2003).  
Additional work is necessary to determine what precisely is happening at the very 
highest income levels. But one more piece of evidence with respect to the poorest 99 percent 
of the distribution – which can be measured with confidence in the CPS data – is that our 
trends for income inequality are consistent with the trends in wage earnings over this period 




We analyze trends in income inequality in the USA over three decades (1975–2004), drawing 
on internal CPS data that are not generally available to researchers outside the Census Bureau. 
Although the CPS is the most authoritative survey data source for studying US income 
inequality, censoring of each of its many sources of income artificially lowers the level of 
inequality and potentially affects estimates of its trends over time, whether one uses public or 
internal CPS data. We consider several methods for addressing censoring, and as a byproduct 
of this work, derive a revised cell mean imputation series that can be applied to public use 
data. This series allows researchers to more accurately capture levels and trends in the 
internal data. In addition, we take account of censoring in the internal data using a multiple 
imputation approach that uses parametric methods to derive imputations.  
U
T
sing the Gini coefficient to measure inequality, we find the level of income inequality 
based on our Internal-MI series is slightly higher in corresponding years inequality based on 
the Internal-Unadjusted series before 1993 and significantly higher after 1993. But despite 
this difference in levels, the trends in inequality we find using the two series are not 
significantly different. Inequality rose over the whole period 1975–2004, but the rate of 
increase slowed after 1993. We find this same result using our Internal-CC and Public-CC 
estimates. 
he story about trends differs when we use the three GE inequality indices, but the 
differences are readily explicable in terms of the properties of the indices, specifically their 
differences in sensitivity to income differences in different ranges of the income distribution. 
I(0) rose steadily during 1975–2004, showing no sign of slowing down after 1993. But our 
I(1) and I(2) series are similar to our Gini series in their trends, subject to the caveat that I(2) 
indices are less precisely estimated, showing large year-on-year variation. Because I(0) is 
more bottom-sensitive than the other inequality measures, our results suggest that what is 
  31happening in the upper part of the income distribution is responsible for the 1990s slowdown 
in rate of inequality increase.  
Our results for household income are largely consistent with other research that has 
examined levels and trends in wage inequality using public use CPS data (see e.g. Autor, 
Katz and Kearney, 2008) but differ from the results found by Piketty and Saez (2003) after 
1986 almost solely due to different trends in the share of income held by the richest 1 percent. 
With IRS data about the distribution of adjusted gross income, not only do Piketty and Saez 
find higher levels of inequality over all years than we do, but also a major increase in 
inequality between 1986 and 1988 and a greater increase in income inequality trends in the 
post-1993 period. Although the rapid increase in income inequality in their tax data is caused 
in part by changes in the way income is reported rather than a real change in underlying 
income inequality, it is less certain why they find such larger increased in income inequality 
after 1993.  
Our results suggest that, for at least the poorest 99 percent of the income distribution, 
the increase in inequality since 1993 has been significantly slower in the USA than in the 
previous two decades. Based on our Internal-MI series we find the level of income inequality 
rises when we include an estimate that includes the very top part of the income distribution 
censored in the unadjusted internal CPS data. But even in these estimates, the rise in income 
inequality slowed after 1993. Our findings are consistent with those found by Piketty and 
Saez (2003) for the 90
th–99
th percentile groups. It is only with respect to the richest 1 percent 
that we differ. And it is here that we are at the limits of current knowledge, both with respect 
to the CPS data because of its difficulty in obtaining information on the highest income 
households, and with respect to the IRS data because of behavioral effects caused by changes 
in the tax laws. It is difficult to fully understand how much of the yearly changes in inequality 
are the result of real changes in the incomes of the very richest income tax units and how 
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Labor Earnings       
Wages  I51A  WSAL_VAL  Wages and Salaries 
Self Employment  I51B  SEMP_VAL  Self employment income 
Farm I51C  FRSE_VAL  Farm  income 
Other Sources    
Social Security  I52A  I52A_VAL 
Income from Social Security and/or Railroad 
Retirement 
Supplemental Security  I52B  SSI_VAL Supplemental  Security Income 
Public Assistance  I53A  PAW_VAL Public  Assistance 
Interest I53B  INT_VAL  Interest 
Dividends Rentals  I53C  I53C_VAL  Dividends, Rentals, Trust Income 
Veterans  I53D  I53D_VAL  Veteran's, unemployment, worker's compensation 
Retirement I53E  I53E_VAL  Pension  Income 
Other  I53F  I53F_VAL  Alimony, Child Support, Other income 
1987–2006 
Labor Earnings       
Primary earnings  ERN_VAL  ERN_VAL  Primary Earnings 
Wages  WS_VAL  WS_VAL  Wages and Salaries-Second Source 
Self Employment  SE_VAL  SE_VAL  Self employment income -Second Source 
Farm  FRM_VAL  FRM_VAL  Farm income -Second Source 
Other Sources    
Social Security  SS_VAL SS_VAL  Social  Security Income 
Supplemental Security  SSI_VAL  SSI_VAL Supplemental  Security  Income 
Public Assistance  PAW_VAL  PAW_VAL  Public Assistance & Welfare Income 
Interest INT_VAL  INT_VAL Interest 
Dividends DIV_VAL  DIV_VAL  Dividends 
Rental RNT_VAL  RNT_VAL  Rental  income 
Alimony ALM_VAL  ALM_VAL  Alimony  income 
Child Support  CSP_VAL  CSP_VAL  Child Support Income 
Unemployment UC_VAL  UC_VAL  Unemployment  income 
Workers Comp  WC_VAL  WC_VAL  Worker's compensation income 
Veterans VET_VAL  VET_VAL  Veteran's  Benefits 
Retirement - Source 1  RET_VAL1  RET_VAL1  Retirement income - source 1 
Retirement - Source 2  RET_VAL2  RET_VAL2  Retirement income - source 2 
Survivors - Source 1  SUR_VAL1  SUR_VAL1  Survivor's income - source 1 
Survivors - Source 2  SUR_VAL2  SUR_VAL2  Survivor's income - source 2 
Disability - Source 1  DIS_VAL1  DIS_VAL1  Disability income - source 1 
Disability - Source 2  DIS_VAL2  DIS_VAL2  Disability income - source 2 
Education assistance  ED_VAL  ED_VAL  Education assistance 
Financial assistance  FIN_VAL  FIN_VAL Financial  Assistance 
Other OI_VAL  OI_VAL  Other  income 
Sources: Current Population Survey Annual Demographic File Technical Documentation, 1976-2002. Current 
Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement Technical Documentation, 2003-2007 
  37Appendix Table 2: Rate of censoring when using consistent censoring procedures 
 
  
Public Consistent  
Censoring Points   











Wage 1.31  2001    0.36  1984 
Self Employment  3.93  1978    1.38  1984 
Farm 2.42  2001    0.28  1983 
Public Assistance  0.48  1995    0.48  1995 
Supplemental Security  1.94  1994    0.30  1992 
Social Security  0.40  1997    0.40  1997 
Interest 1.15  2004    0.21  2004 
Dividends 1.58  2001    0.15  1984 
Veterans / Workers Comp  0.23  1985    0.00  1986 
Retirement 0.17  1979    0.10  1984 
Other Income  0.17  1979    0.07  1984 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using public use and internal March CPS data 
 
  38